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I.

INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago, Professor Graham Douthwaite said that
restitution can "arise in a bedazzling variety of situations."' He also
said that practitioners usually are not aware of "the restitutionary
implications or potential" of their clients' problems.2 Over 50 years
ago, Professor John Dawson said that "[iut is doubtful even now
whether most lawyers have an adequate conception of the range and
resources of the remedy.",3 About twenty years ago, I said of Professor
Dawson's statement, "It is doubtful whether the situation has much
improved in the last thirty years." 4 Unfortunately, I can still repeat that
concern.

* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. I
would like to thank Douglas Laycock for inviting me to speak at the Remedies
Workshop of the American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting, January,
2007. I would also like to thank the Dean's Fund of the Washington College of
Law for generously supporting my scholarship.
1. GRAHAM DOUTHWAITE, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 3
(1977).
2. Id.§ 1.1, at 2.
3. JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 22 (1951).
4. Candace S. Kovacic[-Fleischer], Applying Restitution to Remedy a
Discriminatory Denial of Partnership, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 743, 761 (1983).
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I attribute the lack of understanding of this field to "a great deal
of confusion in terminology" 5 and "that its application has at times
been confused and inconsistent."s6 I also attribute the confusion to the
age of the Restatement ofRestitution, which was published in 1937. 7 It
has been hailed as a major work tying together concepts about
restitution and unjust enrichment that had previously not been
organized into a coherent whole. 8 It is not always cited today; instead,
a great array of terminology continues in often confusing usage. As
one recent court notes, "Courts generally treat actions brought upon
theories of unjust enrichment, quasi-contract, contracts implied in law,
and quantum meruit as essentially the same. In fact, this 'terminology'
employed interchangeably, often within the same
is generally
9
opinion."
The American Law Institute is in the process of drafting a new
Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, the Restatement
(Third), with Professor Andrew Kull as its Reporter.' 0 This immense
undertaking should make the field much more accessible to the modem
lawyer. Professor Kull has the advantage, and the overwhelming task,
of examining and selecting from" 70 years of writings by lawyers and
scholars, since the last Restatement.
The Third Restatement that is emerging is bringing clarity and
precision to the field of restitution and unjust enrichment. This paper
has evolved from a brief talk I gave at the Remedies Workshop of the
American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting in January,
2007. At this workshop, I focused on the clarity that the Third
Restatement is bringing to the confusing area known as quantum
5.

Id.

6.

Id. at 769.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (1937).
E.g., 1 GEORGE PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 4; Peter Birks,
Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1767, 1768 (2001).
7.
8.

9.

Bennett v. Artus, 20 P.3d 560, 563 n.3 (Alaska 2001) (citing Alaska Sales &

Serv., Inc. v. Millet, 735 P.2d 743, 746 n.6 (Alaska 1987)); see also Tanaguchi-Ruth +
23-26 (2005) ("Although the paths of
Assoc. v. MDI Guam Corp., 2005 Guam 7

quantum meruit and unjust enrichment have, for at least a century, diverged, they do
share a long common ancestry. Some discussions, indeed, still use the terms
interchangeably."); cf Hayes Mech., Inc. v. First Indus., L.P., 812 N.E.2d 419, 426
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) ("Quasi-contract claims include unjust enrichment and quantum
meruit actions.").
10. A Restatement (Second) of Restitution was begun in 1983, but was never
finished.
11. Dare I say "kulling"?
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meruit. About 20 years ago, I wrote an article analyzing quantum
meruit cases because I had found them confusing in both my Contracts
and Remedies texts. 12 Reading more cases led me to conclude that the
area of quantum meruit was confused. This paper will describe some of
the confusion that existed, and continues to exist, in quantum meruit
litigation. It will then discuss how the Third Restatement's approach
should eliminate much of the confusion.

II.

CONFUSION WITH QUANTUM MERUIT

A.

Reasons for Confusion

As I described in my article of 20 years ago, there were a
number of reasons for confusion in the area of quantum meruit. 13 One
source of confusion is that quantum meruit is a cause of action in two
fields: restitution and contract. Another is that in those two fields,
quantum meruit has many synonyms. When quantum meruit is an
action in restitution, it can also be referred to as a "contract implied in
law" or a "quasi-contract." When it is an action in contract, it can be
referred to as a "contract implied in fact." Not surprisingly, references
were not always properly applied; nor are they 20 years later. For
example, a court in 2004 classified unjust enrichment and quantum
meruit actions as two different quasi-contract actions.1 4 None of these
distinctions would be important, however, if the remedy for all were the
same. But it is not-another reason for the confusion.
A contract implied in fact is a contract, but not an express
contract. 15 Its elements are typically described as a request by the
defendant for plaintiff's services (an offer), which are performed (the
acceptance) under circumstances in which the parties expect the
plaintiff to be compensated (consideration).1 6 It is not an express
contract because a term has not been discussed. Often it is the price
term. When that is the case, if payment is contested after the work has
12. Candace S. Kovacic[-Fleischer], A Proposalto Simplify Quantum Meruit
Litigation, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 547 (1986).
13. Id. at 549-62.
14. Hayes Mech. Inc. v. First Indus., L.P., 812 N.E.2d 419, 426 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004).
15. Kovacic[-Fleischer], supra note 12, at 555.
16. Id.
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been performed, the court or jury can infer that the price the parties
intended to govern their contract was the reasonable market value of
plaintiff's services. 17 That inferred price will be the measurement of
recovery.
A contract implied in law, or a quasi-contract, is not a contract,
but an action in restitution in which the defendant received a gain at
plaintiffs expense under circumstances that make it unjust for the
defendant to keep the gain. Measuring gain is a little trickier than
measuring the reasonable value of plaintiffs services.
One
measurement of the gain can be the same as the measurement for a
contract implied in fact-the reasonable value of plaintiffs services.
That measure is appropriate when the defendant requested the
plaintiff's work on the theory that the defendant benefits by receiving
what he or she asked for. Another measurement in a quantum meruit
restitution action is the value the defendant received from the plaintiff's
work, unrelated to the market value of the work or plaintiffs cost in
performing the work. 18 The Third Restatement notes that "[t]he
possibility of competing measures of enrichment accounts for much of
the complexity of the rules .... 19
The confusion as to how to measure a remedy in quantum
meruit remains current. The Illinois court, referred to above, which
classified quantum meruit and unjust enrichment actions as distinct
quasi-contract actions, distinguished them by remedy, saying "In a
quantum meruit action, the measure of recovery is the reasonable value
of work and material provided, whereas in an unjust enrichment action,
the inquiry focuses on the benefit received and retained as a result of
the improvement provided by the contractor. '' 20 This is an odd
statement because it assumes that there are two quasi-contractual
actions with separate remedies, one of which is the remedy for
contracts implied in fact. By definition, however, a quasi-contract is
not a contract. A contract implied in fact, as the label implies, is a
contract. The implied in fact contractual remedy of reasonable value
may be a quasi-contractual remedy, but only if the defendant validly
requested the plaintiff's services. If not, the quasi-contractual remedy
17. Id. at 556.
18. Id. at 557-58.
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49
cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
20. Hayes Mech., Inc. v. First Indus., L.P., 812 N.E.2d 419, 426 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004).
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is defendant's unjust enrichment. Thus, while contracts implied in fact
or implied in law are distinct from each other, the remedies for a
contract implied in law may include the remedy for a contract implied
in fact, but the contract implied in fact remedy cannot include unjust
enrichment
B.

Consequences of Confusion

When courts are inconsistent in deciding whether a quantum
meruit action is one in contract or restitution, they may dismiss a case
for lack of an element that was really not necessary for the case 2 1 or
22
dismiss a case although an appropriate element was present. When
courts are unsure how to measure the remedy, cases may have
inconsistent results.23 One of the more practical problems of these
confusions is that when "the proper analysis is not clear, there is a high
probability that trial and appellate courts will not agree on result,
creating unnecessary remands and unpredictable litigation." 24 When
cases are unpredictable, not only in outcome of liability but also in
outcome of remedy, settlement negotiations are particularly difficult.
When parties want to settle a case because of uncertainty in outcome,
but are also uncertain as to how recovery would be measured if it were
obtained, it may be hard for parties to know where to start negotiations.
For example, imagine one scenario with three possible remedial
outcomes. Assume a builder grades a parcel of land. After having
graded the land, the builder envisions that the land increased in value
by $125,000 because it is zoned for development. That value becomes
irrelevant, however, because the builder graded the wrong parcel,
which is zoned for farming. In Scenario A, make three assumptions:
(1) the reasonable value of the builder's services is $100,000, while the
increased value of the farmer's land from those services is $50,000; (2)
although $50,000 is the increased value of the land, $100,000 is clearly
the amount of recovery if the builder should win; but, (3) the
circumstances of the mistake are such that the builder and landowner
21. Kovacic[-Fleischer], supra note 12, at 560-61.
22. Id. at 623-24.
23. Id. at 636-37.
24. Id. at 562; see also id. at 609,622, 629 (discussing how court confusion over
the proper measurement of damages causes excessive appeals, excessive remands, and
a general lack of consensus regarding whether or not to permit recovery in quantum
meruit).
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each have a 50% chance of winning. With those assumptions the
parties might "split the difference" and settle at $50,000 to avoid
litigation costs and the risk of loss.
In Scenario B, change assumption (2) as follows: although the
reasonable value of the plaintiffs services is $100,000, $50,000 is
clearly the amount of recovery if the builder should win. The parties
still have an equal chance of winning. The parties might compromise
at $25,000 for the same reasons they compromise in Scenario A. In
Scenario C, however, change assumption (2) again, this time so that the
maximum amount of recovery is either $100,000 or $50,000 regardless
of which party wins. A "split the difference" of $75,000 for the risk of
losing the case would be greater than either settlement where the
method of measuring recovery were certain. This might cause one or
both of the parties to go to trial, hoping that they will win and that the
measure of recovery that favors them will be used. As a second step, if
"split the difference" were applied again, this time to account for both
the risk of losing the case and the risk of an unfavorable measure of
recovery, the settlement would be $37,500. Now the settlement result
is less than either settlement if the recovery were certain. Again, the
parties might be more likely to go to trial, hoping for a favorable
outcome on both liability and recovery, than if the method of measuring
recovery were certain.
If the law were clear as to when the reasonable value of
plaintiff's services is the appropriate remedy and when the value to the
defendant is the appropriate remedy, then settlements might be more
likely. Eliminating some excess litigation would save resources both of
the parties and the judicial system.
C.

Proposalto Clarify Confusion

In my 1986 quantum meruit article, I recommended that
whether an action were labeled "in fact" or "in law" was not
important. 25 After analyzing a number of cases, I concluded that the
important distinction was whether the defendant had requested the
benefits or not.26 I recommended that if the plaintiffs services were
validly requested-requested without malum prohibitum-the
reasonable value of plaintiff s services was an appropriate measurement
25. Id. at 556-58.
26. Id. at 645.

QUANTUM MER UIT

Fall 2007]

either as a contractual remedy or as a measurement of defendant's gain,
on the theory that the defendant benefited by receiving what he or she
asked for. 27 When the defendant did not request plaintiff's services, I
recommended not that the action be dismissed, but that courts consider
whether it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the enrichment.28
In determining unjustness I recommended that courts consider the
conduct of the parties as well as the plaintiffs ability to pay either at
the time of trial or later after imposition of a lien. 29 The Third
Restatement adopts much of this approach.

III.

THE THIRD RESTATEMENT AND QUANTUM MERUIT

A.

Problems in MeasuringDefendant's Benefit

Part III (Remedies) of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichmentstates that a basic premise of the law of unjust
enrichment is measuring "the extent of the defendant's unjust
enrichment at the expense of the claimant" rather than measuring the
amount of plaintiffs loss as is done in tort or contract actions.3 ° The
Restatement identifies three problems that are involved in measuring
unjust enrichment: (1) the difficulty of determining the defendant's
benefit when the defendant has received services or property from the
plaintiff in a nonconsensual exchange; (2) the difficulty of adjusting the
amount of recovery depending upon the conduct of the defendant,
whether innocent, negligent, or worse; and (3) the difficulty of
determining when secondary enrichment is appropriate.3 1
Addressing the first difficulty, how to measure nonmonetary
benefits, § 49(2) identifies four different possible measurements: "(a)
the value of the benefit in advancing the purposes of the recipient; (b)
the cost to the claimant of conferring the benefit; (c) the market value
of the benefit; or (d) a price fixed by agreement between the claimant
and the recipient." 32 Throughout much of Part III is an assumption that
27.
28.
29.
30.
7, topic
31.
32.

Id. at 602.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 638-41.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

1, introductory note (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
Id.
Id. § 49(2).

pt. 3, ch.
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the value of the types of measurement are listed in ascending order of
value, from (a) to (d). The Restatement says that "'value to the
recipient' is usually the most restrictive (and therefore the most
33
favorable to the defendant) of the available measures of enrichment."
The largest measurement of the benefit, the disgorgement remedy, is
described34 in § 51 as the "net profit attributable to the underlying
'

wrong."

Sections 49, 50, and 51 together address the second and third
problems: determining the amount of recovery, including the addition
of secondary gain, based upon the degree of innocence or wrongdoing
of the recipient of the benefit. The Restatement moves from the least
restrictive measurement to the largest recovery based on the degree of
innocence or culpability of the recipient of the benefit. 35 As it says,
"[T]he enrichment of a wrongdoer (conscious or otherwise) is not less
than the market value of the benefits wrongfully obtained; whereas an
innocent recipient will not be liable for market value of unrequested
benefits whose value in advancing the recipient's purposes is

33. Id. § 49 cmt. d.
34. Id. § 51(3).
35. This paper's analysis of the Restatement's treatment of quantum meruit
actions addresses only the situation where the value of the benefit to the recipient is
less than any other measurement of its value, including the reasonable value of
plaintiff s services that conferred the benefit. The situation in which the plaintiff's
services created a benefit to the defendant greater than the value of the services is
beyond the scope of this paper. So too is the analysis of the degree of culpability of
defendants in those situations. Compare Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101,
105 (Ct. App.1998) (not discussing the defendant's culpability, but saying, "the
threshold requirement [in quantum meruit claims] that there be a benefit from the
services can lead to confusion, as it did in the case before us. It is one thing to require
that the defendant be benefited by services, it is quite another to measure the
reasonable value of those services by the value by which the defendant was
'benefited' as a result of them. Contract price and the reasonable value of services
rendered are two separate things; sometimes the reasonable value of services exceeds
a contract price. And sometimes it does not.") (internal citations omitted), with
Kovacic[-Fleischer], supra note 4 (discussing the culpability of defendants in cases
involving allegations of discrimination in denying partnership and recommending
disgorgement of defendant's net profit); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49 cmt. f, cross-referencing § 28 illus. 11 (Tentative
Draft No. 5, 2007) (discussing unmarried co-habitants, and suggesting that restitution
can only be recovered to the amount of fair market value of services unless acquired
by fraud).
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something less.",36 The Restatement explains that "the potential
inefficiency of most nonconsensual transactions"' 37 is why "cost or
market value often exceeds value to the recipient."
B.

Identification of Quantum Meruit

The Restatement uses the term quantum meruit only once. It
says, "Liability in restitution for the market value of goods or services
is the remedy traditionally known as quantum meruit."38 Although
speaking of quantum meruit in a restitutionary action, the Restatement
identifies quantum meruit with contract implied in fact elements, saying
that quantum meruit "is the usual measurement of enrichment in cases
where the benefits conferred were requested by the recipient, absent a
valid agreement as to price." 39 Whether the Restatement is discussing
quantum meruit in terms of restitution or contract implied in fact does
not matter, however, because the Restatement identifies only one
method of valuation. Because the Restatement is viewing quantum
meruit as an action in which the defendant has requested plaintiffs
services, it says
Because benefits that the recipient has requested are
presumed to have value to the recipient at least equal to
their market value (assuming no valid agreement
otherwise), the restitutionary liability of an innocent
recipient of requested benefits is not reduced by a
showing that the benefits in question were ultimately
unprofitable to the recipient in a particular case.4 °
Thus, what the Restatement identifies as important for quantum
meruit is not the terminology surrounding it or even its relationship to
contract law. The Restatement does not mention quasi-contract,
contract implied in law, or contract implied in fact. What it does say is
that the measurement of recovery for requested services is the
reasonable value of plaintiffs services. "Where the recipient has
36.
7, topic
37.
38.
39.
40.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. 3, ch.

1, introductory note (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
Id. § 49 cmt. d.
Id. § 49 cmt. f.
Id.
Id.

136
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requested the benefits in question, without specifying a price, the
presumptive measure of enrichment is the market price.'
C.

Quantum Meruit Analyzed, but Not Identified

Many courts do not restrict the use of quantum meruit to actions
to recover requested benefits.42 Many courts also identify actions in
which a plaintiff seeks to recover benefits from a defendant who had
not requested them as those in quantum meruit.4 3 Although the
Restatement does not refer to quantum meruit after its one mention in
terms of benefits requested by the defendant, it describes other
scenarios in which courts have invoked quantum meruit and describes
how to measure those benefits. In cases in which the recipient of the
benefit did not request it and was not responsible for its creation, the
Restatement limits recovery to "the measure that yields the smallest
liability in restitution.",44 For example, the Restatement says that if a
contract for the sale of land is rescinded for no fault of the seller and
the buyer had made improvements, "liability for such improvements is
measured by the purchaser's cost or the resulting value to the vendor,
whichever is less."45
D.

Valuation of Requested and UnrequestedBenefits

The Restatement uses the distinction between benefits that were
requested by the recipient and those that were unsolicited as one
measure of the innocence of the recipient. While innocent recipients
are given the most protection by the Restatement, the measurement of
their benefit differs depending on whether those recipients requested
the benefits or not. Specifically, § 50(2) states the following:
41. Id. § 49 cmt. d.
42. See Kovacic[-Fleischer], supra note 12, at 571-75 (observing that most
courts demonstrate little understanding and little consistency in analyzing quantum

meruit).
43. See id. at 628 (noting the recognition of quantum meruit actions against third
party defendants who have no contract or other binding relationship with the plaintiff);

see also Hayes Mech., Inc. v. First Indus., L.P., 812 N.E.2d 419 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(contractor seeking recovery in quantum meruit from building owner for work done at
request of tenant).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 50(2)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
45. Id. § 49 cmt. e.

Fall 2007]

QUANTUM MERUIT

If a nonmoney benefit is susceptible of valuation by
more than one ... measure[] .. ., the unjust enrichment
of an innocent recipient is normally determined (a) in
the case of unrequested benefits, by the measure that
yields the smallest liability in restitution; or (b) in the
case of benefits conferred at the valid request of the
recipient, either by market value or by a price fixed by
agreement.46
Comment d to § 50 explains, however, that "[i]f the recipient is
not responsible for the transaction, liability in restitution is limited to
the lesser amount [of either market value or value to the recipient]. 47
Comment e further protects recipients of unrequested benefits, saying
that if "the value of a benefit exceeds the cost of conferring it, the
restitutionary liability of an innocent recipient will not exceed the
amount required to indemnify the claimant." 48 In other words, the
innocent recipient will be liable only for cost.
Finally, the Restatement provides practical protection for
innocent recipients of unrequested benefits. The Restatement considers
"the possibility of prejudice if the recipient of unrequested, nonmoney
benefits is required to pay for them in cash."4 9 The Restatement notes
that if the benefit is nonmonetary, the recipient cannot use it to pay a
judgment without liquidating it. Requiring immediate liquidation of the
50
benefit would "subject the innocent recipient to a forced exchange."
So as not to prejudice an innocent recipient who is not "demonstrably
enriched," the Restatement suggests "postponing the effectiveness of
the remedy" by allowing restitution "only when realized on a
51
subsequent sale" or by the imposition of an equitable lien.,
46. Id. § 50(2) (emphasis added).
47. Id. § 50 cmt. f.
48. Id. § 50 cmt. e.
49. Id. § 49 cmt. i.
50. Id. § 50 cmt. f.
51. Id.; see also Kovacic[-Fleischer], supra note 12, at 639 ("In determining
unjustness in a third-party situation where the [innocent] defendant could not return or
prevent the benefit, the court should first inquire into the conduct of the parties. For
example, did the plaintiff [contractor who improved tenant's premises at request of the
tenant but without permission of the owner] assume the risk that the [tenant] would
not be able to pay? Was plaintiff negligent in incurring the costs? In [another case,]
was the plaintiff negligent in mistaking the authority of the contracting party? Could
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RECOMMENDATIONS

Given the amount of confusion the term quantum meruit elicits,
the Reporter of the Restatement might want to add a paragraph
specifying that a number of the scenarios in Part III are those which
lawyers and courts label quantum meruit. The Reporter might
specifically suggest that the term be dropped in favor of an analysis of
whether defendant's benefits were requested or not.
There are a few categories in which I would suggest alterations
in recovery. When a plaintiff seeks to enforce a contract unenforceable
for malum prohibitum, I would suggest that he or she should be
awarded the least possible recovery-"the value of the benefit in
advancing the purposes of the recipient" 52--on the theory that the
53
defendant's request for plaintiffs services cannot be a valid request.
I would also suggest reducing the amount of recovery to a plaintiff
seeking to recover under a contract invalid under the statute of frauds.
Rather than awarding the contract price, which might interfere with the
policies of the statutes of frauds, I would suggest that the plaintiff
recover the reasonable value of his or her services if that value is less
54
than the contract price.

the defendant, however, have stopped the work? Second, the court should determine
whether the defendant is in a position to pay. How liquid is the benefit? Would it be
a hardship for the defendant to pay for it? Could the court impose a lien on the
property? Can the defendant afford to pay for the benefit? Does the plaintiff's loss
outweigh the hardship to defendant in having to pay? The courts do not ask these
questions, yet the defendant's possible inability to pay is a major reason that the courts
do not award restitution.").
52. RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF RESTITUTION

AND

UNJUST

ENRICHMENT

§ 49(2)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
53. Compare id. § 49 (limiting recovery under contracts unenforceable due to
malum prohibitum to claimant's cost to perform to penalize the transaction but avoid
forfeiture), with Kovacic[-Fleischer], supra note 12, at 625-26 (suggesting that a court
consider many factors before determining "whether forfeiture is the appropriate
penalty" when claimant is seeking recovery under an "illegal contract").
54. Compare id. § 49 cmt. g (noting that with a contract "unenforceable solely
because of a formality," such as the statute of frauds, "the value of the performance is
presumptively equal to the price the recipient agreed to pay for it."), with Kovacic[Fleischer], supra note 12, at 601-03 (suggesting that the reasonable value of
plaintiff's services, but no more than the contract price, is the appropriate measure of
recovery under a contract invalid due to the statute of frauds).
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CONCLUSION

The Third Restatement should make the field of restitution and
unjust enrichment far more accessible to lawyers and judges. It
identifies the different ways the "defendant's gain" remedy can be
measured, and includes in that measurement an option for the
reasonable value of plaintiff's services. The Restatement then provides
a detailed plan for the application of each of the different measurements
based on whether the benefits were requested or not and based on the
amount of responsibility, if any, the defendant had in receiving the
benefit. The logical structure for limiting or expanding the liability of
the defendant for the value of benefits received will provide guidance
that has been lacking. This guidance should enable lawyers to survey
all possible recoveries for their clients and enable them to more
accurately predict the risks of litigation. Thus they should realize the
bedazzling nature of the field.

